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Abstract
Although the theory of the assertoric syllogism was Aristotle’s great
invention, one which dominated logical theory for the succeeding two
millenia, accounts of the syllogism evolved and changed over that time.
Indeed, in the twentieth century, doctrines were attributed to Aristotle
which lost sight of what Aristotle intended. One of these mistaken
doctrines was the very form of the syllogism: that a syllogism consists
of three propositions containing three terms arranged in four figures.
Yet another was that a syllogism is a conditional proposition deduced
from a set of axioms. There is even unclarity about what the basis
of syllogistic validity consists in. Returning to Aristotle’s text, and
reading it in the light of commentary from late antiquity and the middle
ages, we find a coherent and precise theory which shows all these claims
to be based on a misunderstanding and misreading.
Keywords: syllogism, reduction, invalidity, natural deduction, ecthesis, Aris-
totle.
1 What is a Syllogism?
Aristotle’s theory of the assertoric, or categorical, syllogism dominated much
of logical theory for the succeeding two millennia. But as logical theory
developed, its connection with Aristotle because more tenuous, and doctrines
and intentions were attributed to him which are not true to what he actually
wrote. Looking at the text of the Analytics, we find a much more coherent
theory than some more recent accounts would suggest.1
Robin Smith (2017, §3.2) rightly observes that the prevailing view of the
syllogism in modern logic is of three subject-predicate propositions, namely,
two premises and a conclusion, whether or not the conclusion follows from
the premises. Such a view is found in, e.g., Quine (1962, p. 73). Łukasiewicz
(1951, p. 2) claimed that a syllogism is really a single conditional proposition
with a conjunctive antecedent, and similarly, either logically true or not.
Corcoran (1974, p. 92) argued that for Aristotle a syllogism is “a deductive
argument (premises, conclusion, plus a chain of reasoning).” In contrast to
1At least Stebbing (1930, p. 81)—apparently the source of the account of the syllogism
in Lemmon (1965)—admitted that her account departed from Aristotle’s.
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these rather different modern views, John Buridan, writing in the fourteenth
century, declared:2
“It seems to me that Aristotle takes a syllogism not to be com-
posed of premises and conclusion, but composed only of premises
from which a conclusion can be inferred; so he postulated one
power of a syllogism [to be] that from the same syllogism many
things can be concluded.” (Buridan, 2015, III i 4, p. 123)
He referred, in particular, to Aristotle’s remark at the start of the second
book of the Prior Analytics (II 1), where he says:
“Some syllogisms . . . give more than one conclusion.” (53a4-6)
Aristotle’s own description of the syllogism is at the start of the first
book (I 1):3
“A syllogism is an argument (λόγος) in which, certain things
being posited, something other than what was laid down results
by necessity because these things are so.” (24b19-20)
But Striker’s translation here of ‘λόγος’ is contentious and prejudicial. Other
translations render it as ‘discourse’ (Tredennick in Aristotle, 1938) or ‘form
of words’ (Jenkinson in Aristotle, 1928) and (Smith in Aristotle, 1989). In
his translation of the Prior Analytics (Aristotle, 1962), Boethius rendered it
in Latin as ‘oratio’, a genus covering anything from a word to a paragraph,
or even a whole speech. Moreover, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics,
Boethius made further distinctions, drawn apparently from Cicero’s Topics:
“An argument is a reason (ratio) producing belief regarding a
matter [that is] in doubt. Argument and argumentation are not
the same, however, for the sense (vis sententiae) and the reason
enclosed in discourse (oratio) when something [that was] uncer-
tain is demonstrated is called the argument; but the expression
(elocutio) of the argument is called the argumentation. So the
argument is the strength (virtus), mental content (mens), and
sense of argumentation; argumentation, on the other hand, is
the unfolding of the argument by means of discourse (oratio).”
(De Topicis Differentiis: Boethius, 1978, p. 30)
He repeats the last clause in Book II, and continues:
“There are two kinds of argumentation; one is called syllogism,
the other induction. Syllogism is discourse in which, when certain
things have been laid down and agreed to, something other than
the things agreed to must result by means of the things agreed
to.” (Boethius, 1978, p. 43)
2In fact, as Hubien (1975, p. 274) observed, Buridan recognized that his own account
of the syllogism was different from Aristotle’s.
3Translations from Prior Analytics I are those by Gisela Striker in Aristotle (2009)
unless otherwise stated. Those from Prior Analytics II are by Hugh Tredennick in Aristotle
(1938).
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As one can see, Boethius’ definition of the syllogism repeats (with the addi-
tion of ‘agreed to’) Aristotle’s description in the Prior Analytics, which itself
repeated his earlier account in the Topics (100a25-27).
Smiley (1973, p. 138) invoked the “Frege point” to argue that Corcoran’s
interpretation will not work. For in different arguments (that is, argumen-
tations as chains of reasoning), one and the same proposition may have a
different force, as assumption or assertion or question, but the same syllogism
is in play. Smith, in the ‘Introduction’ to his edition of the Prior Analytics
(Aristotle, 1989, pp. xv-xvi) argued that what Aristotle says at 24b19-20,
repeating the same formula from the Topics, is not so much a description
of the syllogism as he will come to develop it in the Prior Analytics but of
deduction or valid argument in general. For Aristotle later tries to show that
every deduction can be reduced to a succession of syllogisms. The most we
can say is that a syllogism for Aristotle must, as Buridan realised, include a
set of premises from which one or more conclusions can be shown to follow
validly. This is the interpretation given by Al-Farabi:
“A syllogism is, at a minimum, composed of two premises sharing
one common part.”4
So what Aristotle is ultimately interested in is which pairs of assertoric,
subject-predicate propositions are productive, that is, yield conclusions of
the same sort. That’s compatible with his including in that quest an ex-
amination of the argumentation by which those conclusions are produced,
with investigating which triples, quadruples of propositions, and so on, are
productive, and conversely, with discovering what premises will substantiate
a given conclusion.
This explains how, if one does include the conclusion, the resulting “syl-
logism” is by definition valid, since the conclusion “results by necessity” from
the premises. A demonstrative syllogism is then a productive set of premises
each of which is in fact true, while a dialectical syllogism is such a set not nec-
essarily satisfying this restriction.5 In the simplest case, a syllogism is a pair
of premises from which a syllogistic conclusion can be inferred. More gener-
ally, a simple or compound syllogism is a set of two or more premises yielding
a distinct syllogistic conclusion pairwise, that is, by taking the premises in
pairs to yield intermediate conclusions which can be paired with further
members of the set.
But Corcoran was right to emphasize the deductive character of syllogis-
tic reasoning. Recognising that, first, a (simple) syllogism consists simply
of a pair of premises, secondly, that the premises constitute a syllogism
just when a suitable conclusion can be deduced from them (as assumptions)
avoids the unnecessary dispute we find in, e.g., Łukasiewicz (1963, ¶4) and
(1951, §8) and Kneale and Kneale (1962, pp. 80-1) as to whether a syllogism
4Rescher (1963, §(vi), p. 59). See also Duerlinger (1968, p. 481) and Rescher (1965, p.
35).
5See Topics 100a25-31.
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is a conditional proposition or an inference.6 It is neither. But of course, if
the premises do constitute a syllogism, then there is an associated valid infer-
ence and it can be expressed in a conditional with a conjunctive antecedent.7
So a syllogism, or at least the associated inference, is, by its very definition,
valid, contrary to the modern view cited above from (Quine, 1962, p. 74).
Nonetheless, this still leaves important questions open. One of them con-
cerns existential import. I’ve argued elsewhere (Author, a) that there is a
coherent account of syllogistic propositions which satisfies all the relation-
ships in the traditional square of opposition and at the same time allows the
inclusion of empty and universal terms; moreover, that this was Aristotle’s
intention. On this interpretation, affirmative propositions are false if their
subject is empty; the corresponding negative propositions are accordingly
true on that same condition. Existence goes with quality, not with quan-
tity. This interpretation becomes more plausible when particular negative
propositions are expressed, following Aristotle’s own form of words, as ‘Not
all S are P ’, or better, ‘P does not belong to all S’ (equivalently, ‘P does
not belong to some S’), rather than ‘Some S is not P ’.
2 Syllogistic Validity
Once we are clear about what constitutes a syllogism and the truth-conditions
of syllogistic propositions, we can start to consider the basis of validity in
Aristotle’s theory. The core theory of the assertoric syllogism is contained
in Prior Analytics I 4-6. The syllogisms there all consist in two subject-
predicate premises containing three terms, two extremes (or “outer” terms)
and one middle term shared between the premises. The premise containing
the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise (and that term,
the major term), that containing the subject of the conclusion the minor
premise (and that term, the minor term). Prior Analytics I 4 describes the
first figure, in which the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate
of the other. Let us write ‘PxS’ to represent ‘P belongs to x S’, where ‘x’
is a: ‘every’, e: ‘no’, i: ‘some’ or o: ‘not every’, that is:8
PaS: ‘P belongs to every S’
PeS: ‘P belongs to no S’
PiS: ‘P belongs to some S’
PoS: ‘P does not belong to every S’
6See also Duerlinger (1968, pp. 488-90) and Thom (1981, §2).
7See also Smiley (1973, p. 139).
8I will leave aside so-called “indefinite” or “indeterminate” propositions since I read
Aristotle as treating them not as a separate class or type of propositions but as indeter-
minately universal or particular, and so implicitly included in the fourfold classification.
See, e.g., Topics III 6, 120a6-20.
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Then the form of the first figure is:9 AxB
ByC
Syllogisms of the first figure are perfect because the middle term, B, links
the premises immediately and evidently:
“Whenever, then, three terms are related to one another in such
a way that the last is in the middle as a whole and the middle
either is or is not in the first as in a whole, it is necessary for
there to be a perfect syllogism with respect to the extremes . . .
It is also clear that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect, for
they all reach their conclusion through the initial assumptions.”
(25b32, 26b29-30)
We say that pairs are productive when a syllogistic conclusion follows.
Aristotle identifies four syllogisms in the first figure: the pairs aa, ea, ai
and ei. If we include the strongest conclusion each yields, we obtain the four
traditional forms; known by their traditional names, they are:10
Barbara
AaB
BaC
AaC
Celarent
AeB
BaC
AeC
Darii
AaB
BiC
AiC
Ferio
AeB
BiC
AoC
These four moods are “evident” in virtue of what is traditionally called the
dictum de omni et nullo:
“For one thing to be in another as in a whole is the same as for
the other to be predicated of all of the first. We speak of ‘being
predicated of all’ when nothing can be found of the subject of
which the other will not be said, and the same account holds for
‘of none’.” (24b28-31)
For example, he shows how the pairs ai and eo are productive and derives
the strongest conclusions from them:
9Note that ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ here are schematic letters, not variables, as, e.g., Bochenski
(1951, 1962) repeatedly claims. But Aristotle is concerned with form, contrary to Corcoran
(1994, pp. 12-13). In fact, Aristotle’s word for ‘figure’ is ‘schema’.
10The names of the moods in the medieval mnemonic are (see, e.g., Peter of Spain, 2014,
p. 191):
Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio Baralipton
Celantes Dabitis Fapesmo Frisesomorum;
Cesare Camestres Festino Baroco; Darapti
Felapton Disamis Datisi Bocardo Ferison.
The semicolons separate the three figures. The first three vowels in each name give the
quantity and quality of the premises (major, then minor) and conclusion. There is much
more information packed into the mnemonic, which we will come to later.
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‘For let A belong to every B and B to some C. Now if ‘being
predicated of all’ is what was said at the beginning, it is necessary
for A to belong to some C. And if A belongs to no B and B
belongs to some C, it is necessary for A not to belong to some C.
For it was also defined what we mean by ‘of none’.” (26a24-26)
Thus the perfect syllogisms are, we might say, analytically valid, valid in
virtue of the meaning of the logical terms in them, namely, ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘some’
and ‘not’. They are self-evident, and do not need any further or more elab-
orate demonstration that they are productive. Once recognised, they will
become themselves rules of inference whereby the validity of further syllo-
gisms (in the second and third figures) is demonstrated.
2.1 Invalidity in the First Figure
There are 16 possible combinations of syllogistic premises in each figure
(restricting ourselves just to particular and universal premises). Aristotle
has established that four of these combinations yield a valid conclusion in
the first figure, namely, aa, ea, ai and ei. In fact, he observes, each of the
four types of proposition, a, e, i and o, can be established by a first-figure
syllogism. He proceeds to show that each of the other 12 combinations does
not yield a valid conclusion, and so is not a (valid, first-figure) syllogism.11
His method is the method of counterexamples:12 he specifies substituends
for A, B and C in each pair of premises such that, first, the premises are
true as well as AaC, then substituends making the premises true as well as
AeC. Since the premises are thus consistent with AaC, that means that
AoC cannot follow from the premises, and since they are consistent with
AeC, neither can AiC follow. Consequently, neither can AeC follow (or
its subaltern AoC would follow), nor can AaC follow (or its subaltern AiC
would too).
Thus, Aristotle takes syllogistic validity to be formal. In fact, he does
more than this. Many authors have been puzzled to determine what is the
actual basis of syllogistic validity. It might appear that all validity is based on
the perfect syllogisms to which all others are reduced (as we will see below).
But the basis of the validity of the perfect syllogisms is not their perfection:
that explains their self-evidence, as described at 26b29, but not their valid-
ity. Rather their validity consists in the lack of any counterexample. Thus
Aristotle adopts what Etchemendy (1990) calls an interpretational account
of validity, as found in Bolzano and Tarski, as opposed to a representational
one.
Let’s look at a couple of counterexamples to first-figure invalidity. First,
consider the pair ae, that is, AaB, BeC:
• For A,B,C take the triple ‘animal’, ‘human’, ‘horse’: ‘Every human is
an animal’, ‘No horse is a human’ and ‘Every horse is an animal’ are
11But see §3 below.
12Corcoran (1974, p. 105) calls Aristotle’s method that of “contrasting instances”.
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all true
• Now for A,B,C take the triple ‘animal’, ‘human’, ‘stone’: this time,
‘Every human is an animal’, ‘No stone is a human’ and ‘No stone is an
animal’ are all true (26a8-9)
Thus both AaC and AeC are consistent with AaB and BeC. So, by the
argument above, no syllogistic conclusion follows in the first figure from the
pair ae. Note that Aristotle does not suppose that no horse is white, say, but
takes substituends for A,B and C such that the premises are (actually) true
and the conclusion false. For example, take the pair of premises ‘Every white
thing is coloured, No horse is white’. To show that it does not follow that
not every horse is coloured, one might postulate a possible world in which
no horse is white, but all are, say, black. Then the premises are made true,
but every horse is still coloured. This is representational semantics, taking
the basis of validity to be the impossibility of the premises being true and
the conclusion false. In constrast, what Aristotle does is reduce the intuitive
or representational account of invalidity, of the failure of the premises to
necessitate the conclusion, to the interpretational account, the existence of
a counter-instance.13 Moreover, he does this not only for the assertoric
syllogisms in Prior Analytics I 4-6, but also for the modal syllogisms in I
9-22. Note, however, that when he writes, e.g.,
“Nothing prevents one from choosing an A such that C may be-
long to all of it,” (30b30)
he is not claiming that the conclusion might be false, as in representational
semantics, but that the conclusion is false, that is, that its contradictory, ‘C
possibly does not belong to every A’, is true. For this is the contradictory
of ‘C necessarily belongs to every A’. So once again, what Aristotle does is
to provide a substitution-instance where the premises and the contradictory
of the putative conclusion are in fact true.
Now take any pair of particular premises, that is, ii, io, oi, oo. A similar
pair of substitutions will show that no syllogistic conclusion follows:
• For A,B,C take the triple ‘animal’, ‘white’, horse’: some white things
are animals and some aren’t; some horses are white and some aren’t;
but every horse is an animal
• Now for A,B,C take the triple ‘animal’, ‘white’, ‘stone’: some white
things are animals and some aren’t; some stones are white and some
aren’t; but no stone is an animal (26b25)
Again, AaC and AeC are consistent with the premises, so nothing follows
in the first figure from two particular premises.
Aristotle proceeds systematically through the remaining seven pairs of
premises, producing substituends for A,B,C to show that none of these pairs
yields any i or o conclusion, and hence no a or e conclusion can follow.
13Corcoran (1974, p. 103) calls this “one-world semantics”.
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2.2 Validity in the Second, or Middle Figure
The form of the second figure is: MxN
MyX
that is, the middle term is predicate in both premises. Aristotle identifies four
more (valid) syllogisms in the second figure. Again showing the strongest
conclusion that can be drawn, we have:
Cesare
MeN
MaX
NeX
Camestres
MaN
MeX
NeX
Festino
MeN
MiX
NoX
Baroco
MaN
MoX
NoX
However, he describes these syllogisms all as imperfect, that is, as not self-
evident. Referring to Cesare and Camestres, he says:
“It is evident, then, that a syllogism comes about when the terms
are so related, but not a perfect syllogism, for the necessity is
brought to perfection not only from the initial assumptions, but
from others as well.” (27a16-19)
Aristotle employs three methods to establish (or to perfect—see Cor-
coran, 1974, p. 109) the imperfect syllogisms. The main method he calls
“ostensive”, and contrasts with “hypothetical”. Although Corcoran (1974, p.
89) was right to call Aristotle’s methods of proof “natural deduction” meth-
ods, that is, using rules to derive a conclusion from certain premises, he
mischaracterizes the essential feature of such systems. It is not just that
in such systems “rules predominate” over axioms (though they do). They
also predominate in sequent calculus systems, but those are not natural de-
duction systems. What characterizes natural deduction is that one proceeds
from assumptions to conclusion.14 Accordingly, in ostensive proof, Aristotle
assumes the premises of the putative syllogism, then uses simple or acci-
dental conversion to infer the premises of a first-figure syllogism, draws the
first-figure conclusion, and then, if necessary, uses further conversions to ob-
tain a second-figure conclusion.15 Setting the proof out in the manner of
Fitch (1952) follows Aristotle’s text almost to the letter. For example, here
14See, e.g., Jaśkowski (1934, p. 5) and Gentzen (1969, p. 75).
15The medieval mnemonic uses certain consonants, following the vowels, to record the
moves needed to demonstrate the imperfect moods:
• the initial letter (A,B,C,D) records which perfect mood will be used
• ‘s’ following a vowel marks simple conversion
• ‘p’ following a vowel marks accidental, or partial, conversion (i.e., per accidens)
• ‘m’ tells us to invert the order of the premises
• ‘c’ following a vowel marks a proof using reductio per impossibile on that premise.
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is his proof of Cesare, by reduction to Celarent:16
MeN
MaX
NeM
MaX
NeX
Premise
Premise
Simple conversion
Repetition
Celarent
He writes:
“For let M be predicated of no N and of all X. Now since the
privative premiss converts, N will belong to no M ; but it was
assumed that M belongs to all X, so that N will belong to no
X—this was proved before.” (27a6-9)
The Fitch-style derivation and Aristotle’s reasoning match closely: Aristo-
tle’s reasoning could be a description of the derivation, and the derivation
formalizes the reasoning exactly.
2.3 Reduction per impossibile
The ostensive method also reduces the validity of Camestres and Festino to
the first figure (to Celarent and Ferio respectively). But, Aristotle observes,
it cannot be used to show the validity of Baroco. For only the major premise
converts, and then only to a particular, and we have seen that nothing fol-
lows in the first figure from two particulars. So he uses a different method,
that of reduction per impossibile, which he describes as a special case of hy-
pothetical proof. This is a further feature of so-called “natural deduction”:
that assumptions may be discharged in the course of a deduction. Such dis-
charged assumptions are (temporary) hypotheses, made solely “for the sake
of proof”, or “for the purpose of reasoning” (Corcoran, 1974, p. 70).
As with ostensive proof, Aristotle starts by assuming the premises of the
syllogism whose validity needs to be demonstrated. But then he makes a
further assumption, taking as hypothesis the contradictory of the putative
conclusion. For example, to demonstrate Baroco:
See Peter of Spain (2014, IV 13). William of Sherwood (1966, p. 67) gives a slightly
different, and perhaps muddled account of the mnemonic.
16See also Corcoran (1974, p. 111) and Barnes (1997, p. 70). We could also represent
the proof in tree form (see von Plato, 2016):
MeN
NeM
Simple Conversion
MaX
NeX
Celarent
But the representation of the proof given in the text in Fitch style seems better to accord
with Aristotle’s reasoning, as we will see.
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MaN
MoX
NoX
NaX
MaN
NaX
MaX
MoX
Premise
Premise
Hyp
Reiteration
Repetition
Barbara
Reiteration
per impossibile
He writes:
“Again, if M belongs to all N but does not belong to some X, it
is necessary for N not to belong to some X. For if it belongs to
all X and M is predicated of every N , it is necessary for M to
belong to every X. But it was assumed that it did not belong to
some. And if M belongs to every N but not to every X, there
will be a syllogism to the effect that N does not belong to all X;
the proof is the same.” (27a36-b2)
Contrary to what Łukasiewicz (1951, §18) says (endorsed by Bochenski, 1962,
pp. 77-8), this is a valid deduction of the conclusion NoX, by deducingMaX
by Barbara, contradicting the minor premise MoX, as Corcoran (1994, p.
12) notes. Aristotle’s method of reduction per impossibile is indeed a so-
called “natural deduction” method of proof by deduction from assumptions,
both categorical (the premises) and hypothetical (for the sake of argument).
The passage suggests that although Aristotle distinguishes ‘N does not
belong to some X’ from ‘N does not belong to every X’, he rightly thinks
they are equivalent and play the same role in proof. We might say that
‘some’ “scopes out”, that is, takes wide scope over ‘not’.
Aristotle only appeals to reductio per impossibile twice, once in figure
II, as above, and once in figure III. But he mentions several times, after an
ostensive proof, that the syllogisms in question could also have been proved
by a reduction per impossibile.17 In his examples, he never embeds such a
reduction in itself, or uses it as the main proof, but only as a hypothetical
subordinate proof, as noted by Corcoran (1974, p. 116). Again, a reduction
per impossibile always concludes with that step. So he seems not to conceive
of it as a general method of proof, but only restricted to the establishment
of syllogistic conclusions. Note that the subproof in such a reduction need
only conclude in contraries (though often, as above, they are in fact con-
tradictories). But the assumption for the reduction must, of course, be the
contradictory of the ultimate conclusion to be proved.
Note that talk of reduction per impossibile is a bit of a misnomer, as
noted by Smith in Aristotle (1997, pp. 119-20). The subproof shows that
the contradictory of the desired conclusion entails a falsehood, that is, the
contradictory (or perhaps the contrary) of one of the premises, which are
17He discusses it at length in Prior Analytics II 11-13.
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assumed to be true. What is impossible is that both hold together. So Aris-
totle’s rule is strictly weaker than reductio ad absurdum, equivalent rather to
modus tollendo tollens: from a deduction of Q from P and the contradictory
(or contrary) of Q we can infer the contradictory of P . Reductio ad absur-
dum involves a structural contraction, so is invalid in contraction-free logics,
whereas modus tollendo tollens does not, and so is valid in them.18
2.4 Invalidity in the Second Figure
Invalidity by counterinstance proceeds in the second figure as for the first, by
giving triples of substituends for M,N,X. The only point of novelty arises
with the pair eo, that is MeN , MoX:
“Terms for not belonging: black, snow, animal. For belonging to
all one cannot find terms if M belongs to some of the X, but not
to others. For if N belongs to all X and M to no N , then M will
belong to no X; but it was assumed that it did belong to some.
It is not possible, then, to find terms in this way, and one must
prove the point from indeterminacy. For since it is true that M
does not belong to some X even if it belongs to none, and there
was no syllogism when it belonged to none, it is evident that
there will not be one in this case either.” (27b15-23)
Thus to show that NiX, and consequently NaX, does not follow fromMeN
and MoX we note that ‘No snow is black’, ‘Not every animal is black’ and
‘No animal is snow’ are all true. But to show that NoX, and so also NeX,
does not follow from the same pair, MeN and MoX, Aristotle appeals to
the fact that that he has already shown that NoX does not even follow from
the stronger premises MeN and MeX, by citing the triple ‘line’, ‘animal’,
‘human’ (27a21): ‘No animal is a line’, ‘No human is a line’ and ‘Every
human is an animal’ are all true.
2.5 Validity in the Third, or Last Figure
The form of the last figure is:19 PxS
RyS
that is, the middle term is subject in both premises. Aristotle identifies a
further six valid syllogisms in the third figure:
Darapti
PaS
RaS
PiR
Felapton
PeS
RaS
PoR
18See, e.g., Routley (1982, ch.3 §9).
19We will consider in §3.1 whether Aristotle has overlooked a fourth figure.
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Datisi
PaS
RiS
PiR
Disamis
PiS
RaS
PiR
Bocardo
PoS
RaS
PoR
Ferison
PeS
RiS
PoR
Once again, all these syllogisms are imperfect, requiring establishment by
some form of reduction.
Aristotle reduces five of the third-figure moods to the first figure by the
familiar ostensive method. For example, Disamis is proved as follows:
PiS
RaS
SiP
RaS
SiP
RiP
PiR
Premise
Premise
Simple conversion
Repetition
Repetition
Darii
Simple conversion
Aristotle writes:
“For since the affirmative (sic!) premise converts, S will belong
to some P , so that since R belongs to all S and S to some P ,
R will belong to some P and hence P will belong to some R.”
(28b8-11)
However, ostension fails in the case of Bocardo as in that of Baroco, and
requires proof by reduction per impossibile (see Corcoran, 1974, p. 111):
PoS
RaS
PoR
PaR
RaS
PaS
PoS
Premise
Premise
Hyp
Reiteration
Barbara
Reiteration
per impossibile
As Aristotle says:
“For if R belongs to all S but P does not belong to some S, it is
necessary for P not to belong to some R. For if it belongs to all
R and R belongs to all S, then P will also belong to all S; but
it did not belong to all.” (28b17-20)
2.6 Exposition, or Ecthesis
Aristotle introduces yet a third method of proof for three of the third-figure
moods, that of ecthesis. Note that all the third-figure conclusions are par-
12
ticular, simply requiring exhibition, assuming premises regarding P , R and
S, of an R which is or isn’t P :
“The demonstration [of Darapti] can also be carried out through
the impossible or by setting out [ecthesis]. For if both terms
belong to all S, and one chooses one of the Ss, say N , then both
P and R will belong to it, so that P will belong to some R.”
(28a24-6)
Ross (1949, p. 311), commenting on this passage and following Einarson
(1936, pp. 161-2), notes that Aristotle uses the term ‘ecthesis’ in two senses,
both for the general procedure of choosing the terms of a syllogism in order
to formalize the argument, and in order to pick out “a particular instance of
the class denoted by the middle term.” Both uses seem to derive from their
application in geometry. Einarson (1936, p. 156) shows in detail how the way
the terms are set out in the basic mood Barbara matches the manner of rea-
soning about propositions found, e.g., in the Sectio Canonis (Barbera, 1991,
pp. 118-21). Such analogy pervades Aristotle’s formulation of syllogistic rea-
soning. But it is the second sense of ‘ecthesis’ which underlies Aristotle’s
third method of proof, sketched in the proof of Darapti just cited.
Proclus (1970, p. 159) (see Friedlein, 1873, p. 203) famously enumerated
the six parts to a Euclidean demonstration: “enunciation, exposition [ecthe-
sis], specification, construction, proof, and conclusion.” This is illustrated
by Bos (1993, pp. 142, 156) for the case of Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’
Theorem. It opens with the enunciation, or statement (protasis) of the the-
orem: “In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right
angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle,” and
then proceeds directly to the exposition: “Let ABC be a right-angled tri-
angle having the angle BAC right.” That is, the exposition [ecthesis], or
“setting out”, takes an arbitrary case (here, of a right-angled triangle) and
gives it a designation, ‘ABC’, named from its vertices. Euclid proceeds to
show that the sum of the squares on the opposite sides satisfies Pythagoras’
result, and so it follows generally, since ABC was an arbitrary right-angled
triangle, that every such triangle has the Pythagorean property.
Aristotle’s use of ecthesis can be seen in a mathematically simpler exam-
ple, but one that is logically more subtle, in Euclid’s very first Proposition
(Heath, 1908, p. 262): “On a given finite straight line to construct an equi-
lateral triangle.” Euclid starts with the ecthesis: “Let AB be the given finite
straight line” (or better—cf. Heath (1920, p. 162)—“let AB be a given finite
straight line”). Euclid then constructs an equilateral triangle on AB, thus
showing that there is such a triangle.
Aristotle’s sketch of a proof of Darapti follows this model. Suppose P
and R both belong to S. Then, given an S, call it n, it follows that some R
is P—this is the protasis or enunciation, i.e., what is to be proved. For if n
is both P and S, something (namely, n) is both P and R (since every S is
R), so some R is P . But what is the basis of that final step?
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The medievals described this step, from ‘n is P ’ and ‘n is S’ to ‘Some S
is P ’ as the “expository syllogism”. But the epithet is misleading. Its basis is
not syllogistic. Rather, they said, its basis is a principle found in Aristotle’s
Sophistical Refutations 6, at 168b32: “Things that are the same as one and
the same thing are the same as one another.”20 Buridan (2001, §5.1.8, pp.
313, 315) writes:
“Every affirmative syllogism holds by virtue of the principle ‘what-
ever things are said to be numerically identical with one and the
same thing, are also said to be identical between themselves . . .
[N]egative syllogisms . . . are valid by virtue of that other princi-
ple, namely: ‘whatever things are so related that one of them is
said to be identical and the other is said to be not identical with
one and numerically the same thing, they necessarily have to be
said not to be identical with each other’.”21
The first of these is similar to the first of Euclid’s Common Notions (Heath,
1908, p. 222): “Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one
another.” But for these principles to be valid, it is crucial that the subjects
are identical in reference, that is, that the premises are singular propositions.
It has been claimed that Aristotle does not include singular propositions
in his syllogistic theory, indeed, that it only includes universal and particular
propositions.22 I have argued against this claim elsewhere.23 In De Inter-
pretatione 7, he describes four classes of proposition, universal, particular,
indefinite and singular. Indefinite propositions are indeterminately universal
or particular (as noted in footnote 8 above), sometimes best interpreted as
universal (e.g., ‘Men are animals’), sometimes as particular (e.g., ‘Men are
white’). Singular propositions could be taken sui generis, thus forming a
hexagon of opposition with the others;24 or as universal, as Aristotle seems
to do at Prior Analytics II 27 (70a27), for example: Pittacus is good, Pitta-
cus is a wise man, so (some) wise men are good. The argument is (he says)
in the third figure, and so by Darapti, with the singular premises interpreted
as universal, and the indefinite conclusion as particular. The premises must
be universal, since they are of the same kind, and as Aristotle says at Prior
Analytics I 24, nothing follows from two particular propositions.
There are, therefore, two distinctive moves in an ecthetic proof, distinct
from, but supporting, syllogistic inference (just as conversion and reductio
per impossibile are not themselves syllogistic inferences but support, that is,
20See also Physics 185b15-16, and Hamesse (1974, p. 140): “Quaecumque uni et eidem
sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem."
21Dico ergo quod omnes syllogismi affirmativi tenent per hoc principium ‘Quaecumque
dicuntur eadem uni et eidem in numero, illa sibi invicem dicuntur eadem’ . . . Nunc de
syllogismis negativis dicendum est. Qui tenent per illud principium ‘Quaecumque sic se
habent quod uni et eidem in numero unum eorum dicitur idem et alterum non idem, necesse
est inter se illa dici non idem’. (Buridan, 2009, pp. 17, 19)
22E.g., Ross (1923, p. 30).
23See Author (a, pp. 536-7).
24See, e.g, Czeżowski (1955).
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validate, syllogistic argument): ecthesis itself, that is, taking an arbitrary
instance; and the principle of Expository Syllogism. But as Aristotle points
out in Sophistical Refutations 6, the latter requires strict identity. Partial
identity will not suffice:
“It is, however, not always true [that things that are the same
as one and the same thing are also the same as one another],
e.g., suppose that A and B are ‘the same’ as C per accidens [i.e.,
partially]—for both ‘snow’ and ‘swan’ are the same as something
‘white’.” (168b34)
For snow and swan are certainly not the same as one another. The principle
requires that A and B be wholly or strictly identical, and for that, the
premises must be singular propositions.
But at the same time, the instances must be syllogistic propositions, so
that we can apply syllogistic reasoning to them. In the proof of Darapti,
knowing there is an S, given that PaS is true, we take a particular S which
is P and call it n. We apply Barbara to this instance, San, introduced by
ecthesis, which with the other premise, RaS, yields Ran. Thus we know
that n is both P and R, and so we infer that something is both P and
R. The conclusion here, both in its form, and in its assumptions, is free of
reference to n, and so the term n is arbitrary and the inference is valid, as
in Existential Instantiation.25
To emphasize the need to treat ‘n’ as arbitrary and so ensure that it
cannot belong to the conclusion, let us indent the subproof involving it, not
based on a hypothesis, but on ecthesis, and labelled with the arbitrary name,
in this case, ‘n’.26 Then the proof runs:
PaS
RaS
n
PiR
San
Pan
RaS
San
Ran
Pan
Ran
Premise
Premise}
Ecthesis
Reiteration
Repetition
Barbara
Repetition
Repetition
Expository Syllogism
In the case of Disamis, with premises PiS and RaS, we again need to
take one of the Ss which is P—call it n:
25See Parsons (2014, pp. 24-29). On Existential Instantiation, see, e.g., Quine (1950, p.
96); but cf. Prawitz (1967) and (Pelletier, 1999, pp. 12-13).
26This follows Fitch’s practice in Fitch (1952, ch. 5, see especially p. 131). We can liken
‘n’ to an arbitrary name, as Lemmon (1965, pp. 106-7) does. See also the comments by
Smith (1982, p. 126).
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PiS
RaS
n
PiR
Pan
San
RaS
San
Ran
Pan
Ran
Premise
Premise}
Ecthesis
Reiteration
Repetition
Barbara
Repetition
Repetition
Expository Syllogism
That is, given PiS, we take one of the Ss which is P , call it n, show that R
also belongs to n, thence concluding that some R is P . Aristotle notes this
method for proving Disamis at 28b15, but without giving any details.
In fact, ecthesis and Expository Syllogism form a pair, giving the meaning
of AiB: AiB ⇔ Aan,Ban (where n is fresh, that is, arbitrary, and treating
the RHS conjunctively).27 From AiB we can infer Aan and Ban by ecthesis,
and from Aan and Ban we can infer AiB by Expository Syllogism.
Aristotle also suggests using ecthesis to prove Bocardo:
“If R belongs to all S but P does not belong to some S, it is
necessary for P not to belong to some R . . . (This can also be
proved without reduction to the impossible if one chooses one of
the Ss to which P does not belong.)” (28b17-21)
The negative version of the rule for ecthesis will permit the inference of Aen
and Ban from AoB. However, one might worry about the validity of this
rule, since by the interpretation in Author (a), the major premise, AoB, lacks
existential import, and so is true if there is no B. In the case of Bocardo,
however, we do know that the term is non-empty, for the second premise,
RaS, is true only if there are Ss. Hence we can safely take one of the Ss
which is not P .
Conversely, we can extend Expository Syllogism to its negative version,
as in the quotation above from Buridan: AoB ⇔ Aen,Ban, provided there is
a B (n fresh). That is, not only does ecthesis allow us to take some arbitrary
n that is B and not A, but conversely, if there is such an n which is B and
not A, then A and B are distinct. The proof of Bocardo then runs:
27It was not until the twelfth century that a conjunctive proposition was even recog-
nised as such. Martin (2012, pp. 295-8) notes that Boethius denies that conjunctive
constructions produce single propositions (rather than a complex of propositions), and
cites Abelard’s recognition of the conjunctive proposition (propositio copulativa) as “a
fundamental turning point in the history of logic”.
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PoS
RaS
n
PoR
San
Pen
RaS
San
Ran
Pen
Ran
Premise
Premise}
Ecthesis
Reiteration
Repetition
Barbara
Repetition
Repetition
Expository Syllogism
As Aristotle says, we choose an S, namely n, which is not P . Then R must
belong to n, since it belongs to every S, and so P cannot belong to every R.
However, we do not have the same guarantee of the non-emptiness of the
term set out in the case of Baroco:
MaN
MoX
NoX
What can we do? Smith (1982, p. 117) notes that Aristotle himself does not
mention ecthesis in connection with assertoric Baroco, despite appealing to
it in the case of modal Baroco (Prior Analytics I 8, 30a4-14). In fact, the
argument by ecthesis can be made to work, but we need to deal with the
case where X is empty separately, and perhaps this is why Aristotle does not
suggest ecthesis here. For if X is empty, NoX is true for the same reason
that MoX is; while if X is not empty, we can take an X, call it c, which is
not M : MaN and Mec yield Nec by Camestres, and Xac and Nec yield
the conclusion NoX by Expository Syllogism.
Thom (1981, ch. X) observes that it is possible to demonstrate all the
valid syllogisms by the expository method of ecthesis, including the perfect
moods of the first figure. Ecthesis is a distinctly different method from
reduction by ostension or per impossibile. In those methods, validity of
one syllogistic mood is reduced to that of another, which itself needs to be
grounded—either by further reduction, or by the dictum de omni et nullo, or
by ecthesis. Ecthesis is not a reduction, but constitutes a categorical proof.
Moreover, in Prior Analytics I 2, Aristotle uses ecthesis to prove the con-
version of E-propositions: That is,
AeB
BeA
BiA
c
AiB
AeB
Bac
Aac
Bac
Premise
Hyp}
Ecthesis
Repetition
Expository Syllogism
Reiteration
per impossibile
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“Now if A belongs to none of the Bs, then neither will B belong
to any of the As. For if it does belong to some, for example, to
C, it will not be true that A belongs to none of the Bs, since C
is one of the Bs.” (25a15-17)
Supposing that some A is B, take an A which is B, call it c, then we know
both that c is A and that c is B, so some B is A, contradicting the assumption
that no B is A. Aristotle then uses E-conversion to establish the accidental
conversion of A-propositions and the simple conversion of I-propositions—
which is in fact a corollary of the proof, lying at its heart.
2.7 The Final Reduction
Finally, Aristotle adds a further twist to the ostensive method, reducing
Darii and Ferio to Celarent, via the second figure:
“But one can also reduce all syllogisms to the universal ones in the
first figure . . . [The particular moods in the first figure] are per-
fected through themselves, but one can also prove them through
the second figure by reduction to the impossible. For example, if
A belongs to every B and B to some C, then A belongs to some
C. For if it belongs to none, but to every B, B will belong to no
C; this we know from the second figure.” (29b1, 8-12)
Thus Darii is reduced to Camestres (and so finally to Celarent), and simi-
larly, Ferio is reduced to Cesare (and thence to Celarent too):
AaB
BiC
AiC
AeC
AaB
AeC
BeC
BiC
Premise
Premise
Hyp
Reiteration
Repetition
Camestres
Reiteration
per impossibile
AeB
BiC
AoC
AaC
AeB
AaC
BeC
BiC
Premise
Premise
Hyp
Reiteration
Repetition
Cesare
Reiteration
per impossibile
As Aristotle writes:
“The demonstration will be similar in the case of the privative
syllogism [i.e., Ferio]. For if A belongs to no B and B to some
C, then A will not belong to some C. For if it belongs to every
C but to no B, then B will belong to no C—this was the middle
figure [i.e. Cesare].” (29b12-14)
Hence all valid syllogisms can be reduced to the universal perfect syllogisms,
Barbara and Celarent, themselves valid by the dictum de omni et nullo.
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3 The Adequacy of Aristotle’s Theory
Thus in Prior Analytics I 4-6, Aristotle has shown the validity of 14 (simple)
syllogisms. One might, nonetheless, wonder whether this list is complete. In
fact, it is not, as Aristotle himself recognises in I 7. Of course, we’ve already
seen that each syllogism can have more than one conclusion. For example,
Barbara, inferring AaC from AaB and BaC, also warrants Barbari and Bar-
alipton:
AaB
BaC
AiC
AaB
BaC
CiA
Barbari follows from Barbara by subalternation, and Baralipton by acciden-
tal conversion. Neither of these introduces a new syllogism, that is, a new
pair of premises yielding a valid conclusion, since the premises of both are aa
in the first figure. Indeed, provided the conclusions of the 14 syllogisms al-
ready identified are the strongest possible direct conclusions (as in fact they
are), drawing further consequences by conversion and subalternation adds
no new syllogisms. However, Baralipton alerts us to the possibility of an
indirect conclusion. Aristotle has shown by exhibition of counter-instances
that no other pairs of premises yield a valid direct conclusion in any of the
three figures. But we should now ask what further indirect conclusions can
be inferred, and indeed, whether further premise pairs, not yielding a valid
direct conclusion, perhaps yield an indirect conclusion.
It’s easy to show that in the second and third figures, indirect conclu-
sions introduce no new syllogisms. For suppose MxN
MyX
XzN
draws an indirect
conclusion in Figure II. First, interchange the premises: MyX
MxN
XzN
Now reletter, interchanging ‘X’ and ‘N ’: MyN
MxX
NzX
This draws a direct conclusion in the second figure. So either yxz is a valid
second-figure mood, and so already counted, or yxz is invalid in the second
figure, by a counterinstance already noted, and so the same will be true for
xyz. The same argument shows that there are no new syllogisms by drawing
indirect conclusions in the third figure.
However, by this reasoning, two pairs of syllogistic premises in the second
and third figures normally listed as distinct are arguably the same syllogism.
Recall that Aristotle characterizes the second figure as predicating the middle
term in both premises (26b34-37). But Cesare and Camestres differ only in
the order of the premises and of the terms in the conclusion, so they each
show equivalently that premises in which the same term is said to belong
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universally to one subject and to be excluded universally from the other are
productive. They denote the same syllogism.28 Similarly, he characterizes
the third figure as that where the middle term is subject of both premises
(28a10-12). But Disamis and Datisi differ only in the order of the premises
and of the terms in the conclusion. So they each show that premises in which
one predicate is said to belong universally to a subject and another to belong
partially to it are productive, and so denote the same syllogism.
Nonetheless, there are two new syllogisms to be obtained by drawing in-
direct conclusions in the first figure, viz:
Fapesmo
AaB
BeC
CoA
Frisesomorum
AiB
BeC
CoA
Note that ae and ie are new first-figure syllogisms, not included among the
perfect moods. Aristotle recognises the validity of these syllogisms in I 7:
AaB
BeC
CeB
BiA
CoA
Premise
Premise
Simple conversion
Conversion per accidens
Ferio
AiB
BeC
CeB
BiA
CoA
Premise
Premise
Simple conversion
Simple conversion
Ferio
“It is also clear for all the figures that in those cases where no
syllogism comes about, if both terms are positive or privative,
nothing necessary comes about at all; but if one term is positive,
the other privative and the privative is taken as universal, then
a syllogism always comes about of the minor extreme in relation
to the major. For example, if A belongs to all or some B and B
to no C. For if the premisses are converted, it is necessary for
C not to belong to some A. Similarly for the other figures; for a
syllogism always comes about through conversion.” (29a19-26)
3.1 The Fourth Figure
Many writers since Aristotle, arguably starting with Galen (see Rescher,
1965) claimed that there were in fact four figures in the syllogism. The rea-
son was two-fold: they took a syllogism to consist of two premises together
with a conclusion; and they took the order of the premises to matter. Hence
what Aristotle took to be an indirect conclusion in the first figure was tra-
ditionally counted as a direct conclusion in the fourth figure. For example:
Baralipton:
PaM
MaS
PiS
becomes Bramantip:
MaP
SaM
SiP
28Cf. Buridan (2001, §5.4.2, pp. 330-1), (2009, p. 42).
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and Frisesomorum:
PiM
MeS
PoS
becomes Fresison:
MeP
SiM
SoP
This doesn’t yield any further valid syllogisms, but conceptualizes the syllo-
gism differently.29 As Aristotle remarked (I 23):
“Now if it necessary to assume something that is common in
relation to both [extremes], and this is possible in three ways
(for either one predicates A of C and C of B, or C of both, or
both of C), and those form the three figures we have mentioned,
it is evident that every syllogism will necessarily come about in
one of those figures.” (41a13-18)
Buridan (2015, III i 2) agreed:30
“But it should be noted that the fourth figure differs from the
first only in the transposition of the premises, and that trans-
position does not permit inferring another conclusion or prevent
that inference, but affects whether the conclusion inferred is di-
rect only when in the first figure and indirect in the fourth and
vice versa . . . From this it is clear that once the first figure has
been explained it will be superfluous to explain the fourth; so
Aristotle does not mention it.”
3.2 The Total Number of Assertoric Syllogisms
Thus the total number of two-premise assertoric syllogisms according to Aris-
totle is 16. Some, e.g., Al-Farabi focussed exclusively on those listed in Prior
Analytics I 4-6:
“The [types of] categorical syllogisms are fourteen in number . . .
This completes the entire collection of categorical syllogisms.”
(Rescher, 1963, pp. 60, 73)
But this omits ae and ie in the first figure, which, we have seen, Aristotle
specifically mentions in Prior Analytics I 7.31
Theophrastus is said to have added the five indirect moods to the first
figure that we find in the medieval mnemonic: Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis,
Fapesmo, Frisesomorum, making a total of 19.32 But this includes Baralip-
ton, Celantes and Dabitis, which just draw new conclusions from aa, ea and
ai in Figure I, already included. This slip was observed by Buridan:
29See, e.g., Hubien (1975, p. 279).
30See also Buridan (2001, §5.1.6, p. 311), (2009, pp. 14-15).
31Barnes (1975, p. 65) also omits the two novel imperfect first-figure moods.
32See, e.g., Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 100), Barnes et al. (1991, pp. 185-6) and
Apuleius in Londey and Johanson (1987, §XIV).
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“In the first figure in addition to the four moods concluding di-
rectly . . . Aristotle describes only two other moods that . . . con-
clude indirectly, namely, Fapesmo and Frisesomorum . . . Nor did
he list Baralipton, Celantes and Dabitis in addition to Barbara,
Celarent and Darii, since according to the definition they do not
differ from them.” (Buridan, 2015, III i 4, pp. 123-4)
Galen and Porphyry are reported to have split Darapti into two moods,
Darapti and Daraptis, hence giving a total of 20.33 But again, Daraptis is
not new, being derivable from Darapti by simple conversion, showing that
the premises aa in figure III “have more than one conclusion”.
More recently, the 19 Theophrastian moods listed in the medieval mnemonic
(translated to Figure IV) were augmented by the weakened or “subalternate”
moods Barbari and Celaront (in Figure I), Cesaro and Camestrop (in Figure
II) and Camenop (in Figure IV)—the full 24 usually listed as 6 valid moods
in each of four figures.34 But again, these just draw further conclusions from
syllogistic pairs already recognised.
Buridan includes O-propositions of non-normal form (where the predi-
cate precedes the negation, e.g., ‘Some S some P is not’) in order to permit
conversion of O-propositions (see Author, b, p. 460), and so lists 8 syllo-
gisms in the first two figures and 9 in the third figure, 25 in all.35 He also
distinguishes syllogisms with the same premises in different order. But this
changes the rules, adding non-normal conclusions.
In Appendix 2 to Barnes et al. (1991),36 the total reaches 35, adding
Camestre, Faresmo, Cesares, Cesaros and Firesmo (in Figure II) and Darap-
tis, Fapemo, Datisis, Disami and Frisemo (in Figure III). But these are just
reletterings of known syllogisms, as shown above.
What Aristotle didn’t do in I 7, and needs to be done, is to show that
no further indirect conclusions can be drawn from pairs of premises which
yield no direct conclusion. There are none in the second and third figures,
since indirect conclusions reduce to direct conclusions by interchanging the
premises, as we have seen. To show that there are no further indirect con-
clusions in the first figure from the remaining 11 combinations of premises
is straightforward.
Recall the earlier claim that Aristotle’s account of validity was inter-
pretational. We can invoke the so-called “squeezing argument” of Kreisel
(1967), employed recently by Andrade-Lotero and Dutilh Novaes (2012), to
make the point. First, note that Aristotle’s method of reduction is sound,
that is, whenever there is a reduction to a perfect syllogism in the first figure
there is no countermodel: the premises intuitively necessitate the conclusion.
Moreover, it is complete: we have just noted that if there is no reduction
33See Alexander’s comments in Barnes et al. (1991, 6.2, p. 168) and Boethius’ in Thom-
sen Thörnqvist (2008, pp. 52, 65).
34See, e.g., Kneale and Kneale (1962, pp. 74-5) and Bochenski (1951, 9 C) and (1962,
pp. 71-2).
35Buridan (2015, III i 4, conclusion 8).
36See also Barnes et al. (1991, p. 136 footnote 157).
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then there is a counter-instance. Finally, any counter-instance is intuitively
a countermodel. Hence there is no counter-instance if and only if there is no
countermodel and the premises necessitate the conclusion. Aristotle reduces
the intuitive notion of necessitation to the absence of a counter-instance.
Nonetheless, as we have seen, Aristotle overstated the number of dis-
tinct syllogisms by distinguishing Cesare from Camestres, and Disamis from
Datisi. Accordingly, there are just 14 distinct Aristotelian assertoric syllo-
gisms, 6 in the first figure (4 direct and 2 indirect), 3 in the second, or middle
figure, and 5 in the third and last.
4 Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to correct misreadings of Aristotle, or at least,
misleading accounts of what Aristotle did (e.g., Smith, 2017), and describe
acurately the remarkable account of deduction which Aristotle constructed in
the first few chapters of his Prior Analytics. Syllogistic propositions can be
particular or universal. Aristotle treats singular propositions as universal,
and so-called indefinite (or indeterminate) propositions are taken by him
as indeterminately universal or particular. Existential commitment goes
with quality, not quantity, thus satisfying all the demands of the Square of
Opposition: O-propositions can be expressed either as ‘P does not belong
to every S’ or as ‘P does not belong to some S’, and are true if there is no
S (when the corresponding A-proposition is accordingly false). Aristotelian
syllogisms are, at their simplest, pairs of syllogistic premises yielding a valid
conclusion. There are just three Aristotelian syllogistic figures, turning on
whether the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the other,
predicate of both, or subject of both. Such pairs of premises constitute
syllogisms just when they yield a syllogistic conclusion, that is, when there
is no counterinstance among syllogistic propositions. There are, in total, just
14 pairs of such premises which yield a syllogistic conclusion, that is, there
are 14 syllogistic pairs. Their validity can be established either by invoking
the meaning of the logical expressions given by the dictum de omni et nullo,
or by one of Aristotle’s methods: by ostensive or hypothetical proof or by
ecthesis. But they are not made valid by that reduction and proof, which
serves rather to demonstrate their validity. The basis of their validity is the
lack of any counterexample, that is, the absence of any terms that can be
substituted in the schema that will make the premises true and any putative
conclusion false.
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